campaign practices, 10 courts have rendered decisions favorable to rational electoral outcomes, frequently at the expense of complete freedom of speech. 11 Yet in cases dealing with the volume of information received by voters, principally Buckley v. Valeo, 1 2 the Supreme Court has struck down statutes by which Congress, s or a state legislature, 1 4 has sought to limit the amount of political speech reaching voters.
The Court's decisions in cases such as Buckley have relied on traditional first amendment doctrine and its underlying fear of government regulation of speech. 1 5 This comment argues that the Court's traditional interpretation of the first amendment in election law cases merely substitutes for the evil of government abuse the evil of private abuse of the electoral system by individuals with the resources to exploit voter irrationality. In so doing, the Court treats the first amendment as a barrier to legislation aimed, at least in part, at correcting voter irrationality, and, consequently, as a barrier to more rational electoral outcomes. The Court has recently granted certiorari in Democratic Party v. National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), 16 in which the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania relied on Buckley to invalidate a federal statute limiting the amount of money that a political action committee can spend to further the election of presidential candidates who accept public funding. NCPAC presents an ideal opportunity for the Court to incorporate electoral rationality concerns into its first amendment doctrine.
This comment first examines the importance of rational electoral outcomes from the standpoint of democratic theory and notes campaign literature).
the divergence between the way democratic theory assumes voters will behave and the way they actually do behave. Part II surveys judicial decisions relating to the control of the campaign process, and argues that these cases reveal a willingness on the part of some courts to promote electoral rationality, even when that means limiting speech. Part III discusses Buckley v. Valeo and its progeny, and concludes that these cases, in contrast to those discussed in Part II, improperly favor freedom of speech at the expense of electoral rationality. In Part IV, the comment analyzes the Buckley holding in terms of the traditional first amendment balancing of society's interest in free speech against compelling governmental interests, and suggests that the Buckley Court's decision stemmed from its failure to include in its balance the government's interest in rational voting-a factor which has, with the advent of modern, media-dominated political campaigns, become compelling. Finally, the comment proposes that, in resolving conflicts between the protection of speech and electoral rationality under the first amendment, the public's interest in freedom of speech should be balanced against its vital interest in rational electoral outcomes.
I. THE RATIONALITY OF ELECTORAL OUTCOMES
Our system of government contemplates that electoral outcomes should be rational rather than irrational. 17 The government of the United States was formed for the purpose of achieving certain benefits for its citizens.' Our best leaders are those with qualities that enable them to guide the nation toward the attainment of those benefits. 19 The function of elections is to allow citizens to Unfortunately, electoral outcomes are often in practice less rational than democratic theory would postulate. A growing body of commentary suggests that voters, and hence electoral outcomes, are to a large extent irrational. 23 Political scientists have constructed two competing models to explain voting behavior: the "rational" and "irrational" models. Proponents of the rational model believe that voters are capable of the informed, intelligent voting vital to the role assigned them in a democratic system of government, and thus vote on the basis of their views on the issues disputed in a particular election. 24 Adherents of the irrational model, by contrast, suggest that voters usually lack the ability to make intelligent electoral decisions, and instead vote on the basis of stimuli, such as a candidate's image, 5 unrelated to the proper functioning of the democratic process. 26 tors), 433 (John Dickinson "leaned towards an election [of the President] by the people," which he regarded as the best and purest source), 471 (Benjamin Franklin favored popular election since "[ilt is of great consequence that we should not depress the virtue and public spirit of the common people.").
Ultimately, this dispute led the Convention to settle on a compromise structure for the Constitution. Members of the House of Representatives were to be elected directly by the people, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, Senators were to be elected by the state legislatures, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, and the President was to be elected in a hybrid fashion, by electors chosen by the people specifically for that purpose, U.S. CONST (voters in 1968 election "responsible"; Pomper, From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters, 1956 -1968 , 66 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 415, 416 (1972 U5 At least one study has concluded that, while issues are of some importance to many voters, "images of the presidential candidates are ... the most important factor in the electoral decision." RePass, supra note 4, at 400.
" See, e.g., B. BERLusoN, P. LAzArsPELD & W. McPHEE, VOTING 309-11 (1954) (worka- ble democratic system does and must include some uninterested voters); A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. SToKEs, supra note 3, at 171-76 (very low proportion of voters had ideological conception of election issues); Stokes, Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency, 60 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 19, 25 (1966) (voters are influenced by candidates' personalities as they are portrayed in the media). See generally CONTROVERSIS IN AmERICAN VOTING BEHAVIOR (R. Niemi & H. Weisberg eds. 1976 ) (presenting an overview of the debate among political scientists as to voter rationality). A largely unexamined but generally accepted assumption of democratic theory is that rational voting is preferable to irrational voting. See supra notes [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] and accompanying text. But cf. B. BERELSON, P. LAZARSFELD & W. McPHEE, supra, (the presence in society of uninterested or incompetent voters makes broad social compromises easier and is thus essential to the preservation of the system).
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Protecting Electoral Rationality A rational vote, as noted above, is a vote for a candidate accurately judged by the voter to be the one most capable of fulfilling national goals as perceived by the voter.1 7 Thus, there are at least two elements in a rational vote: the voter must make a judgment, and that judgment must be accurate. The first element is binary: the voter either makes a judgment as to which candidate is best, or he does not. If the voter makes such a judgment, his vote may or may not be rational depending on whether the second element is met, but if he does not make any judgment at all, his vote is plainly irrational 2 The second element, by contrast, is a matter of degree: the greater the degree of accuracy of judgment, the more rational the vote.
Accurate voting, and in particular accurate issue voting, depends on the fulfillment of certain conditions. First, the voter must collect information on which to base his decision. 2 9 This information collection, in turn, depends on three factors: accurate, relevant information must be available; 30 the voter must have the capacity and resources to collect the information; sl and the voter must wish to use his resources to collect the information. 27 See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text. 28 A clear example of a voter making no judgment would be voting by flipping a coin. Perhaps a more common technique, equally void of any element of judgment, is voting by choosing the first listed name on the ballot. See infra note 45 and accompanying text. In general, voting by any random or indifferent decision process amounts to a failure to make a judgment. A voter makes no judgment if he votes for someone under a threat of physical force or under some psychological compulsion, such as hypnotism. The essence of the electoral process is for the voter to choose between candidates in a meaningful way. Once the voter has made a judgment, all that remains to be asked is whether the judgment is accurate. See infra notes 29-39 and accompanying text. The second condition for accurate voting is that the voter, having collected sufficient accurate information upon which to base his decision, must interpret the information in some sense "properly." The ability to interpret information properly depends on education and cognitive skills, 3 as well as on motivation.
34 An accurate vote seemingly must entail analysis of at least two criteria: 3 5 the candidates' positions on the issues faced by the nation, 6 and the candidates' character, in the sense of their ability to bring their positions on the issues to fruition and to lead the nation. 3 7 Finally, the voter must base his decision on the information he has collected and interpreted to the exclusion of irrelevant stimuli or information. 38 A vote is "irrational"-or at least less than persupra note 2, at 221, 231 (voters do not necessarily collect information on issues they consider important); Margolis, supra note 29, at 31 (voters must care about issues Brody & Page, supra note 32, at 231. " Short-cuts may suffice to allow a voter to avoid making a full examination of the issues and each of the candidates' characters. For example, voters might vote on the recommendation of someone they respect, such as a local newspaper or clergyman. The rationality of such a vote depends on the accuracy of the voter's judgment that the recommendor is a reliable weigher of the issues or of a candidate's leadership ability.
"See A. CAMPBELL, P. CONvERsE, W. MILLER & D. SToKEs, supra note 3, at 216-65.
The key to rational voting lies more in the reasoning process than in the consideration or lack thereof of any particular issues. Characteristics normally thought to be unrelated to a candidate's qualifications for office-e.g., race, see Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964) (state may not print candidate's race on ballot because to do so would improperly put state imprimatur on racially-based voting)-may, under certain circumstances, form the basis for a rational vote. For example, a voter may be acting rationally when he votes solely on the basis of race where the voter believes that minority representation in elected bodies must be increased or that black candidates will do more to advance the interests of black citizens than will white candidates. Such a vote is really an issue-based vote, since the issues of concern to the voter involve race and the voter is simply using the candidate's race as a shorthand for calculating the responsiveness of the candidate to those issues. A vote based on race is irrational when there is no reasoned connection between race and the electoral issues of concern to the voter. REv. 779, 793-95 (1976) (discussing importance to voters of candidates' competence).
-1 See infra notes 44-76 and accompanying text (discussing ballot placement and electioneering cases).
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Protecting Electoral Rationality fectly rational-when any of the above conditions is unfulfilled. 9 One of the revolutionary findings of modern political science is the prevalence of irrational voting among the American electorate. 40 . If the economic view is correct, then public welfare will be maximized only if private interest coincides with public welfare, or if some "invisible hand" operates in the political arena, as it is said to do in the economic arena, to achieve the greatest social good when individuals act out of self-interest. See CoNrovmnsmfs IN AmmScAN VOT-ING BEHAVIOR, supra note 2, at 23 ("political system might work best when each individual acts primarily in his or her own interest"). For purposes of this comment, voting based on voters' conceptions of the public welfare and voting based on voters' self-interest that happens to promote the public welfare will be considered rational. Self-interested voting that does not promote the public welfare will be considered irrational for purposes of this comment and democratic theory. 41 One study found that only 3.5% of voters in the 1956 presidential election had an ideological conception of political issues, that 17% lacked any understanding of relevant issues or ideology, and that the rest fell somewhere in between. Id. at 229, 237. Another survey using a similar classification system categorized 13% of voters in the 1956 presidential election as "ideologues" or "near ideologues," and 87% as "non-ideologues. 
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covery has profound implications for the democratic process. The widespread lack of understanding of electoral issues means that many voters vote without due regard for the central questions disputed in elections,. 2 and that many of those who attempt to formulate judgments concerning electoral issues do so inaccurately. This inaccuracy in electoral decision-making makes it less likely that voters will elect the best qualified candidates. Instead, irrational voting raises the possibility of electing candidates who are, at best, less capable than other contenders, or, at worst, incompetent, unscrupulous, or corrupt. To this extent, irrational electoral outcomes, and the irrational voting that causes them, threaten the proper functioning, and ultimately, the survival of the democratic state. 43
II. DECISIONS PROMOTING RATIONAL ELECTORAL OUTCOMES
The divergence between the theory and reality of voting behavior has confronted courts on numerous occasions. While courts have not recognized or labeled their analyses as attempts to promote rational voting, many of their decisions can be so characterized. In addressing the problems created by irrational voting, courts have implicitly demonstrated a commitment to electoral rationality by taking steps, or permitting steps to be taken, to curb irrational voting. Moreover, where the steps necessary to curb irrational voting conflict with first amendment rights, courts have sometimes treated the interest in rational electoral outcomes as sufficiently strong to justify restraints on freedom of speech.
A. Irrationality at the Polling Place: Ballot Placement and Electioneering court's finding that a significant statistical advantage accrued to the first-listed candidate, 9 the court of appeals held that the state had no rational basis for allocating to an incumbent the advantages of preferential ballot placementY e Therefore, the court invalidated the statute. 5 1 Courts that have decided ballot placement cases have rested their holdings squarely on the fourteenth amendment and not on considerations of the rationality of electoral outcomes. 52 The result of these cases, however, is to minimize the effects of irrational voting on electoral outcomes by denying to any single candidate an exclusive windfall 53 of irrational votes. A fair scheme of ballot placement does not increase the rationality of any particular voter's vote; voters are still free to vote for the first-listed candidate." Nonetheless, a random distribution of irrational votes does enhance the rationality of the outcome of the election by depriving certain candidates of the systematic benefits of irrationality. Some courts, in the midst of equal protection analyses, have obliquely recognized the importance of rational outcomes. For example, one court noted:
A fundamental goal of a democratic society is to attain the free and pure expression of the voters' choice of candidates. To that end, our state and federal Constitutions mandate that the government must, if possible, avoid any feature that might adulterate or, indeed, frustrate, that free and pure choice. . . . In our governmental system, the voters' selection must remain untainted by extraneous artificial advantages imposed by weighted procedures of the election process.,"
Ballot placement cases suggest a judicial commitment to rational electoral outcomes, but do not force courts to weigh rational electoral outcomes against first amendment rights. The sections which follow show that the interest in electoral rationality can prevail even at the expense of impinging on freedom of speech.
2. Electioneering. Electioneering, forbidden by statute in most states,5 7 is the making of last-minute appeals to voters in the vicin-(1975) (dictum) ("Although a lottery system for determining ballot position may strike some as 'whimsical' or 'capricious,' such a system, unlike an 'incumbent first' or 'alphabetical order' scheme, does not continually work a disadvantage upon a fixed class of candidates; all candidates are at least afforded an equal opportunity to obtain the preferential ballot position."), with Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057 , 1068 (D. Mass. 1976 ) ("a lottery would, in the end, give only one candidate first priority and would arguably entail an even more arbitrary system than [giving the first ballot position to the incumbent]"). 228, 232, 393 P.2d 428, 432 (1964) (the "primary concern" of a disclosure statute is the harm "suffered by all the people when, as a result of the public having been misinformed and misled, the election is not the expression of the true public will."); State ex rel. Hampel v. Mitten, 227 Wis. 598, 607, 278 N.W. 431, 435 (1938) ("Nothing is more important in a democracy than the accurate recording of the untrammeled will of the electorate. Gravest danger to the state is present where this will does not find proper expression due to the fact that electors are corrupted or are misled."). 1984] ity of the polling place. The paradigm of forbidden electioneering NEv. REV. STAT. § 293.592 (1979) ; N.J. REv. STAT. § 19:34-15 (1964) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-20-16 (1978) ; N.Y. ELEc. LAw § 8-104 (McKinney 1978) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-147 (1982) The invalidation of elections is only one of the major avenues to cleaning up elections, the other being punishment of those who break election laws. Obviously, this is a ubiquitous solution, and the felony conviction of an official, whether or not election-related, can constitute grounds for removal from office. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1304(d) (1) 59 Votes cast as a result of intimidation may be prudent but are not "rational" as this comment defines that word, see supra note 28 and accompanying text, and will not generally be counted in the election returns, see supra note 57. 10 E.g., Fish v. Redeker, 2 Ariz. App. 602, 604, 411 P.2d 40 (1966). The Fish court held that the gravamen of the electioneering offense consisted of a candidate "trying to get his name before the voters in a last chance effort to influence the votes." Id. at 605, 411 P. 2d at 1984] printed on the ballot to explain a complex ballot issue was suggestively worded. 6 1 An even more expansive view of electioneering appears in the federal case of Flamm v. Kusper. 6 2 There, a county clerk who was running for re-election, acting in his capacity as clerk and as required by law, 63 posted in polling places announcements containing voting information but also displaying his own name and office in prominent letters. 6 4 The court held that this method of publicity constituted electioneering, because last-minute exposure to the name of the defendant "may very well influence some uncommitted voters to vote for" the incumbent. 5 In addition to raising a challenge based on the Illinois fair election statute, 66 the plaintiff in Flamm raised an equal protection claim. After noting that a case involving "the right of a candidate for public office to have equal protection or equal treatment" raises a federal question under the Constitution, 7 the court concluded that the frequent repetition of the incumbent's name in the polling place gave him an unfair advantage over his opponent, the plaintiff, and violated her right to equal protection of the laws. 6 Id. court did not consider any first amendment claims of the incumbent, nor did it expressly acknowledge the goal of rational electoral outcomes in its decision.
The type of electioneering prohibited in Flamm presents a clear threat to the rationality of electoral outcomes. The possibility that some suggestible voters might vote for the candidate whose name they have most recently seen or heard raises the specter of an election won not by the candidate most qualified, but by the one most conspicuous at the polls."" This comment argues that electioneering decisions would be better reasoned if they relied on the protection of the rationality of electoral outcomes. Moreover, though the court in Flamm made no mention of first amendment concerns, without a commitment to rational voting in the background, electioneering cases are difficult to explain in light of possible first amendment challenges to these statutes. Electioneering is a form of speech, and any regulation or prohibition of it necessarily implicates the first amendment. 0 At least one court has characterized electioneering statutes as permissible restrictions on the time, place, and manner of campaign speech, 7 1 justifying the restriction on the basis that the presence of campaigners at the polling place interferes with the orderly process of voting." The time, place, and manner rationale does not, however, justify restrictions on the type of electioneering prohibited in Flamm. A poster, button, or sticker does not interfere with the administration of voting to any significant extent. Even if these items have a disruptive potential, state regulation of the 70 The Supreme Court, in the context of a libel suit brought by a senatorial candidate against a reporter who characterized him as a "bootlegger," has stated that the consititutional guarantee of freedom of speech "has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office. 1, 1983 ) (upholding a complaint alleging the unconstitutionality of electioneering statutes against motion to dismiss, but finding that the Illinois law restricting physical closeness of the pollwatcher was a valid time, place, and manner restriction); cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting noise or diversions which disturb the peace and order of schools).
72 The operative test for time, place, and manner restrictions is "whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) . items themselves 1 3 would more effectively accomodate the first amendment interest of individuals in presenting voters with political speech than does an outright ban. 4 Furthermore, a valid time, place, and manner restriction based on the government's interest in orderly voting would not single out campaign speech for restraint; the presence in the polling place of people speaking on other subjects would be equally disruptive.71
This comment proposes that electioneering cases such as Flamm can be best understood as resting on the implicit recognition of a government interest in rational voting. Indeed, restrictions on electioneering are more closely tailored to protect this interest than they are to protect any interest in orderly voting. The first amendment balance 7 is tipped in favor of a ban on speech by 108-15 (1978) .
76 While the first amendment may appear by its language to be an absolute limit on legislative power, it has not been so construed. E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (scope of first amendment protection need not be gathered solely from a literal reading of constitutional language). Instead, the rights guaranteed by the first amendment, the rights of freedom of speech and freedom to associate (which promotes and fosters informed speech, see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (compelled disclosure of membership lists is likely to constitute an effective restraint on its members' freedom to associate)) must be balanced in each case against the governmental interest supporting the governmental restriction on speech. E.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (applying balancing approach to uphold partially and to strike down partially election regulations). The scrutiny engaged in by courts is exacting, and the asserted interest must be "compelling" and "narrowly drawn" before a restriction is upheld. The principal justification for the Court's exacting scrutiny of restrictions on political speech is that in a self-governing society, see Meildejohn, supra note 21, passim (first amendment aimed at assuring effective self-government), political speech is of critical importance. To a great extent, first amendment doctrine conceives of the electoral arena as a marketplace of political ideas, see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), in which ideas are advanced, refuted, see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (remedy for bad or false speech is counterspeech), and discussed by the public in the course of formulating electoral decisions. The very idea of self-government requires that the people be free to discuss and debate political ideas without interference; thus, government may place restrictions on political speech only for the most compelling reasons. This comment argues that the protection of the rationality of electoral outcomes ought to be recognized as one such compelling interest. The first amendment seeks to ban certain governmental interferences with free political speech. But governmental interferences designed to foster rational electoral outcomes serve not to distort the marketplace of political ideas, but rather to correct significant existing marketplace imperfections. These internal market imperfections, due partly to voter irrationality and partly to the maldistribution of resources available for electoral speech, can endanger the democratic political process just as surely as external interferences with political speech. Accordingly, otherwise proper governmental correction of these imperfections should be viewed as an important and permissible regulation of speech. The University of Chicago Law Review (FECA). s2 The Court upheld the provisions against the argument that forced disclosure threatened to chill the right to "privacy of association and belief," 83 thereby deterring those who wished to lend anonymous support to a candidate. 8 4 The court applied "exacting scrutiny" and required a "substantial relation" between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed in order to justify the requirement. 8 5 The Court reasoned that important interests were directly served by three aspects of the disclosure requirements: first, disclosure aids voters in evaluating those who seek public office; second, it deters post-election corruption by identifying generous supporters before the election; and third, disclosure assists the government in gathering the data necessary for enforcement of limitations on campaign contributions. 8 6 Although the Court did not explicitly acknowledge concern for rational electoral outcomes as a legitimate governmental interest, it did use the following language in upholding the disclosure requirements:
[D]isclosure provides the electorate with information "as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate" in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal office. It allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches. The sources of a candidate's financial support also alert the voter to the interests which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office.
87
Implicit in the Court's argument is an assumption that voters are capable of rationally using contribution information, and that they will use that information to predict more accurately the potential performance in office of the candidates, an effect implicitly assumed by the Court to be beneficial. 
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Protecting Electoral Rationality quirements in this manner, therefore, the Court implicitly acknowledged electoral rationality as a factor to be considered in the balancing of speech protection against legitimate state interests mandated by the first amendment.8 9 The implication of the Court's language is that the promotion of electoral rationality, when combined with other governmental interests, may outweigh the impingement on first amendment rights of free speech and association inherent in certain election laws.
2. Disclosure of the Source of Campaign Literature. Another kind of disclosure law, enacted by most states" 0 and by the federal government, 9 1 requires that political campaign literature identify its author or sponsor. Authorship-identity statutes have been challenged on the ground that they may have a chilling effect on speech because forced disclosure deters the dissemination of views by those who wish to remain anonymous. 9 2 Courts have adopted a balancing approach to see "whether the end to be achieved by the disclosure requirement justifies the resulting impairment of freedom of expression." 9 3 In Canon v. Justice Court, 94 for example, the California Supreme Court concluded that a provision of the California Elections Code requiring the identification of the source of comes-would profit from the availability of campaign finance information, thus enhancing the rationality of electoral outcomes. See, e.g., 117 CONG. REc. 29,322 (1971) (statement of Sen. Talmadge) ("Americans have a sacred obligation to exercise their franchise and to do so in an informed and intelligent manner."); id. at 29,323 (statement of Sen. Symington) ("An informed public must be given 'maximum information' about those who hold public office if they are to have an opportunity to properly evaluate their actions and decisions."); id. at 30,071 (statement of Sen. Mansfield) ("I think it is the unanimous belief of the Senators here today, that a more informed electorate is a better electorate, and that with a better electorate you have an improved government.").
While campaign finance disclosure laws presuppose the existence of a group of rational voters, their effect is not vitiated by the presence of irrational voters. Even as to irrational voters, legislatures might hope that the dissemination of potentially useful information will have a salutary effect by educating them as to proper voting habits. campaign material 5 did not violate the first amendment because "the public interest in more complete information and clean, free elections . . . exceeds the interest in the marginal decrease in freedom of expression resulting from loss of anonymity," 96 and because the scope of the statute was "tailored to fit its purpose" in that it was "limited to election campaigns, to writings attacking candidates and then only if the attack is primarily personal in nature." 97 Laws requiring the disclosure of the source of campaign literature enhance the rationality of electoral outcomes in two ways. 98 First, knowledge of the identity of the author gives voters the opportunity to discern bias and make an informed judgment as to the weight the literature should be accorded. 9 Second, statutes banning anonymous campaign literature deter smear campaigns, a potent means of encouraging irrational voting. 1 00 Smear campaigns undermine the rationality of electoral outcomes by misleading voters through falsehoods or appeals to bigotry or stereotypes. 1 0 1 Au-95 CAL. ELEC. Cone § 12047 (1964) . 1041 (1975) , where the court struck down state laws which prohibited "misrepresentation" and "attack on a candidate based on race, sex, religion, or ethnic background." Id. at 88. The court reasoned that it would be a "retreat from reality" to suppose that the public interest in such factors was not great, and held that the state could not legislate the characteristics that were suitable to consider in deciding between candidates. Id. at 94. Even speech that is "offensive" and "provocative," the court stated, is protected by the first amendment so long as it does not fall into the "narrowly limited classes" of unprotected speech, such as fighting words or obscenity. 402 (1964) (the state may not print candidate's race on ballot because "by directing the citizen's attention to the single consideration of race or color, the State indicates that a candidate's race or color is an important-perhaps paramount-consideration in the citizen's choice, which may decisively influence the citizen to cast his ballot along racial lines.").
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Protecting Electoral Rationality thors of campaign literature may be disinclined to indulge in smear campaigns if forced to take credit for their writings. Although the court in Canon did not specifically mention the factor of "rational electoral outcomes," the court did stress the importance of elections being "the expression of the true public will. '10 2 Canon suggests that in balancing first amendment interests courts may find that the societal interest in rational electoral outcomes is sufficiently important to justify some election laws even if such laws might have a somewhat chilling effect on speech. 1 
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false campaign statements against first amendment challenges have reasoned that the statutes were constitutional because they required actual malice on the part of the maker of the false statement and thus did not seriously threaten to chill speech."° While these courts have primarily emphasized the unfairness of false statements to the maligned candidates, their reasoning has also acknowledged the harm to the public and the democratic system when individuals are elected to office on the basis of misinformation:
Nothing is more important in a democracy than the accurate recording of the untrammeled will of the electorate. Gravest danger to the state is present where this will does not find proper expression due to the fact that electors are. . misled ...
. It is. .. possible and feasible to require of candidates that statements known to be false and so substantially bearing upon the fitness of other candidates as to have a tendency to influence votes, shall not be made the basis of appeals for votes .... 10s
Statutes that prohibit the knowing making of false statements about political candidates foster rational electoral outcomes by improving the accuracy of the information on which voters base their electoral decisions. The courts implicitly acknowledge that voters may be persuaded by false information and therefore may vote in a way that subverts rather than enhances good government. Accordingly, where calculated falsehoods threaten electoral rationality, the first amendment balance may be struck so as to permit the restraint of the offending speech. (dictum) . The Hampel court also said that the "tendency of such false statements to affect the result of an election ... is obvious upon its face." Id. at 608, 278 N.W. at 438. The Supreme Court has stated that "the use of the known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of a democratic government and with the orderly manner in which economic, social or political change is to be effected." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (holding that the constitution limits state power to impose sanctions for criticism of the official conduct of public officials to false statements concerning official conduct made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard as to whether they were false or not).
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III. DECISIONS FAILING TO PROMOTE THE RATIONALITY OF ELECTORAL OUTCOMES

A. Rudisill v. Flynn
Courts do not always act to promote rational electoral outcomes, as the case of Rudisill v. Flynn 1 09 demonstrates. In that case, the voters of an Illinois town voted on a public bond issue to finance a construction project. 1 10 Certain members of the town council who stood to gain financially from the construction project waged a campaign for approval of the referendum in which they deliberately understated the cost of, and overstated the need for, the project."" The voters approved the project, and plaintiffs, voters in the election, sued to set aside the results of the referendum on the equal protection and due process grounds that the defendants' fraud impaired their fundamental right to vote. 112 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the cause of action for three reasons. First, since the voters did not misunderstand the issue as it was placed on the ballot and were free to vote for or against it, the court reasoned that the defendants' wrongs were not sufficiently connected with the right to vote itself." 8 Second, the court reasoned that even if the plaintiffs' right to vote was affected, the burden placed on it by the defendants' fraud would be outweighed by the infringement on the defendants' rights of freedom of expression that would result from voiding the referendum.' 1 4 Third, the plaintiffs failed to allege or show as an element of their equal protection claim that, one group was more affected in its right to vote by the defendants' conduct than was another.
5
The court's first reason has the most bearing on this comment's consideration of how a governmental interest in rational electoral outcomes might have affected this case. The plaintiffs argued that the "defendants' 'frauds' prevented the voters from making an intelligent choice," 1 " but the court seemed reluctant to enter into the intricacies of ballot issues and the standard for their presentation to the voters: "The merits of a ballot issue are mat-ters reserved for public and private discussion and debate between opponents and proponents. It is for the voters, not this court to decide whom to elect and what ballot issues to approve. '' 27 From the standpoint of assuring electoral rationality, the court's analysis is inadequate. The court apparently assumed either that voters can detect falsehoods when confronted with them, an ability that voting theory does not ascribe even to rational voters, 1 8 or that the marketplace of ideas can generally be relied upon to produce a rebuttal to false information, certainly an unlikely proposition in this case. 1 1 9 Voters may require even greater protection from false speech concerning ballot issues than they do from false speech about candidates. Referenda, unlike elections, involve the direct participation of citizens in the lawmaking process. Knowledge of the meaning of a referendum vote is often made difficult by the confusing and technical language of ballot measures. 1 20 Unlike elections, where voters may be able to select somewhat rationally on the basis of intangible factors such as the candidates' character, referenda admit of no substitute for a thorough understanding of the issues.2 21 Though the result in Rudisill might be explained by the absence of a statute banning false statements about referenda, 2 2 by the fact that the plaintiffs brought their claims under the equal protection and due process clauses, or by the extreme remedy of invalidation requested, 23 the opinion displays a troubling insensitivity to considerations of electoral rationality. tures in order to equalize candidates' access to the electorate is "wholly foreign" to the first amendment, the purpose of which is to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from all sources.
153
Had the parties or the Court focused on considerations of electoral rationality, the Court might have balanced the interest in rational electoral outcomes against the first amendment restraints posed by the statute. Instead, the Court looked only to the interest of the government in affording citizens a fair opportunity, through an equalization of expenditures, to express themselves," and 153 424 U.S. at 48-49. The Court also held that restrictions on a candidate's freedom to spend his own money on his own campaign was an impermissible burden on the candidate's right to advocate his own election "vigorously and tirelessly." Id at 52. The Court reasoned that there could be no risk of corruption from a candidate's spending his own money;, therefore there was no sufficient governmental interest justifying the restriction. Id. at 53. The Court considered the argument that such limits would help equalize total campaign expenditures, but gave the argument little weight, reasoning that the effect of the limits would be insignificant compared to that resulting from differential success rates at fundraising. Id. at 54. Finally, the Court struck down limitations on total campaign expenditures, arguing that corruption could be better prevented through contribution limitations, and that equalization of expenditures might well handicap lesser-known candidates. Id. at 54-59.
I" Cast only in terms of fairness, the controversy in Buckley revolved not around the constitutionality of legislation seeking to promote rational electoral outcomes, but around considerations of wealth, a factor which has found little place in the Burger Court's constitutional jurisprudence. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (in equal protection context, wealth not a suspect category); Wright, supra note 124 (money, although critical in elections, is not treated by the Court as such). It is unsurprising that the Court, tacitly employing a balancing test, should prefer free speech over governmental correction of the inequitable distribution of wealth. On the other hand, wealth and electoral rationality are intimately related in the context of media campaigning. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text. Language elsewhere in the Buckley opinion suggests that the Court might have been more receptive to an argument based on a government interest in promoting rational electoral outcomes. E.g., 424 U.S. at 14-15 ("In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential"), 49 n.55 ("Democracy depends on a well-informed electorate"), 52-53 (candidates must be able to put views before public "so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and their positions"); see infra text accompanying note 163.
1984]
The University of Chicago Law Review [51:892 found it negligible: "[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment ... 155 The reach of this language is not entirely clear. The Court might have viewed the government's interest in guaranteeing electoral rationality as the kind of government regulation of speech that, however potentially beneficial, was rejected by the framers in favor of a free market of ideas. More likely, though, the Court failed to consider electoral rationality when it struck down the expenditure limitations.
In First National Bank v. Bellotti, 56 the Court confirmed the hostility to limitations on campaign expenditures first evidenced in Buckley. The election law at issue in Bellotti was a Massachusetts statute prohibiting corporations from spending money to influence votes on ballot measures. 1 57 The state attempted to justify this measure on the ground that it reduced the influence of wealthy corporations on electoral outcomes. 58 1" 424 U.S. at 48-49. The Court expressly tied spending money to speech, calling money the "gasoline" in the "automobile" of expression, id. at 19 n.18, and considered expenditure of money to be a form of association, id. at 22. In the words of Justice White, the Court decided that "money talks." Id. at 262 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court therefore had to assess the statute's limitations on expenditures of money under the first amendment. Id. at 14-23. Justice White disagreed with this portion of the Court's reasoning, arguing that the effect on speech of restricting expenditures is incidental. Id. at 262-64. According to Justice White, the Court's reasoning could justify the prohibition of any activity, such as taxation, that "siphon[s] off or prevent[s] the accumulation of large sums that would otherwise be available for communicative activities." Id. at 263. Judge Skelly Wright has argued that spending money is a "form of conduct related to speech," but is not speech itself. Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1006 (1976). In his view, FECA's expenditure limitations targeted money itself, divorced from the kind of communication it could buy, id. at 1008, and thus should have been subjected to a less demanding standard than that applied by the Court. 157 435 U.S. at 767-68. 15 Id.
The Supreme Court struck down the Massachusetts law as a violation of the first amendment. The Court emphasized that "the First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the selfexpression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw." 159 Using an "exacting scrutiny" test, the Court found that neither the state's interest in "sustaining the active role of the individual citizen in the electoral process" nor its interest in protecting the rights of minority shareholders who disagreed with the corporation's stance was sufficiently compelling to justify the subjectmatter restriction of the statute. 60 The Court recognized the importance of individual participation in ballot measure campaigns, but reasoned that people in America were "entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the ... arguments" put forth in a campaign by considering the source of those arguments. 1 "' The Court also reasoned that the Massachusetts legislation was underinclusive if its purpose was the protedtion of minority stockholders because it permitted corporations to make other expenditures and engage in other forms of expression without protecting those minority rights. 6 2 The Court did claim that, if presented with a proper record, it would consider legislative findings that corporations possess a power to drown out the views of others if that power "threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes." 5 6 The Court's general reasoning, however, that the first amendment precludes "paternalism" through state limitations on campaign speech,' 6 suggests that even such findings might not be persuasive.
Finally, in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley," 6 5 the Supreme Court expanded its already broad reading of the first amendment in the area of campaign finance by, for the first time, striking down a statute limiting political contributions. 
In City of Berkeley, the California Supreme Court had upheld a city ordinance enacted to reduce the ability of special interest groups to corrupt the initiative process by spending large amounts of money, by limiting contributions by individuals to groups advocating or opposing ballot measures.
6
The ordinance was challenged as unduly burdening the freedoms of association and expression.. 6 7 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that Buckley's approval of contribution limitations does not apply to ballot measures, since there is no possibility of corruption resulting from spending on behalf of ballot measures. 6 8 Taken together, these cases reveal a serious inconsistency in the judicial approach to problems of voting behavior. In ballot placement, electioneering, disclosure, and truth of campaign information cases, courts have taken a broad view of what measures are permissible to enhance rational voting. This commitment to rational electoral outcomes, however, does not carry over to cases that regulate the volume of information reaching voters by limiting campaign expenditures and contributions. In these cases, the Supreme Court has struck down legislation, arguably promoting electoral rationality, despite congressional and state legislative findings of voter irrationality.
These holdings leave the law in an anomalous state. The same voters who vote for a candidate because his name appears first on the ballot, or because, immediately before entering the voting booth, their eyes light on a sign or button displaying his name, or because they cannot resist the influence of innuendo and smear attacks launched by the candidate against his opponent-these same voters are abandoned to the influences of lengthy, high-pressure media blitzes, 1 6 acknowledged, the threat that unlimited speech poses to the pursuit of rational electoral outcomes, the Supreme Court has failed to address the problem in the context of political expenditures. Traditional first amendment doctrine has shaped the Court's response to volume of information cases: disclosure requirements are permitted, on the ground that their chilling effect on speech is slight in comparison to the additional information they provide, 17 1 while laws limiting the volume or amount of information are not permitted, since they directly restrict freedom of speech. 172 The Court's decisions striking down limits on campaign contributions and expenditures suggest that the Court may interpret the first amendment as embodying a belief that voters can be counted on to act rationally and that therefore the government has no compelling interest in restricting those forms of speech that might encourage irrational voting behavior. Thus, in First National Bank v. Bellotti, 1 7 3 the Court described the task of voters:
[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments. They may consider, in making their judgment, the source and credibility of the advocate. But if there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate the information and arguments advanced by [a speaker], it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the First Amendment. 74 In a more recent case, the Court stated that the first amendment "embodies our trust in the free exchange of ideas as the means by which the people are to choose between ... candidates for public office. The State's fear that voters might make an lladvised choice does not provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting speech. ' 1 7 5 In the Court's view, then, even a legislative finding of danger to the democratic process from widespread irrational voting cannot overcome the first amendment presumption of voter rationality.' But when voters in large numbers behave irrationally, as we now have good reason to believe they do, this traditional gloss on the first amendment stands in the way of achieving rational electoral outcomes.""
The primary concern of the framers of the Constitution in guaranteeing freedom of speech in the first amendment was a fear of regulation of speech as a tool of government oppression.' 7 The dangers of government regulation of speech are gravest in the context of political campaigns: "The fear that a prevailing government might some day wield its power over political campaigns so as to perpetuate its rule generates a commendable reluctance to invest government with broad control over the conduct of political campaigns. ' 179 In light of these dangers, the first amendment is understood to deny to government the power over speech, and instead to allocate that power to the people. 1 80 Implicit in this allocation is one of two assumptions: either that the people can use their power wisely, or, if they cannot, that the dangers of abuse of the power over speech by government exceed the dangers of abuse of that power by individuals. 1 " Today, nearly two centuries after the writing of the Constitution, the first of these assumptions-that the people know how to use their power of speech wisely-has been powerfully challenged. Political scientists have demonstrated that voter irrationality exists, 8 2 casting doubt on the ability of the people to govern themselves intelligently.' 8 " Congress, state legislatures, and some lower courts perceive a threat to the rationality of the electoral process and have attempted to facilitate rational voting and reduce the effects of irrational voting through various election laws. But in vol-ume-of-information cases, the Supreme Court has found that legally imposed limits on the amount of political speech in which an individual may engage transgress the first amendment's allocation of the power over speech to individuals instead of to the government. 18 4 This result can no longer be justified if based solely on a belief in the ability of the people to use this power wisely. Moreover, the second assumption-that the danger of abuse of the power over speech by government exceeds the dangers of such abuse by individuals-is equally questionable. A system of allocating offices on the basis of ability to pay is irrational; there is no relationship between wealth and the ability to lead the nation or promote its welfare. 9 7 Wealth in the political arena thus stands on the same footing as systematic ballot placement, electioneering, anonymous support, and false information. Unlimited speech through money threatens popular democracy and, in turn, the general availability of rights such as freedom of 19 In general, television has the capacity to "focus public attention." T. PATrERasON 
A. A Balancing Test
In the cases discussed in Part II, courts gave some consideration to electoral rationality, though they generally failed to identify it as such. They merely balanced the interest in electoral rationality along with any other interests 9 9 against speech-related interests. Though it is difficult to articulate a consistent doctrine from this case-by-case balancing, the first amendment clearly tolerates some restrictions on speech when electoral rationality, or some proxy for it, is at issue. 2 00
This comment calls on courts to acknowledge explicitly the government interest in rational electoral outcomes, and to include an analysis of that interest in the first amendment balancing of interests. The balancing equation should entail the traditional first amendment considerations: the immediacy of the danger 1°p resented by irrational voting, the existence of a content-differential effect on speech, 0 2 the precision with which any given statute 196 The power of government to restrict speech may seem more objectionable than the power of individuals to speak, but both may have identical results. For example, the counterpart of a government passing a law prohibiting speech critical of incumbents would be an individual spending huge sums of money to produce and capture irrational, exposure-based votes unavailable to a poorer rival. In both cases, the desired result-election of a particular candidate-is achieved through manipulation of the electoral system. In both cases, the likelihood of election of the most qualified candidate is reduced.
29 For example, in the electioneering cases, the government's interest in reducing electoral irrationality was accompanied by an interest in the administration of the voting process. In some cases, however, electoral rationality was the only interest counter-posed against free-speech concerns. For example, in the campaign literature authorship disclosure cases, all the asserted government interests related to the rationality of electoral outcomes. See supra text accompanying notes 91-103. 200 Where the restraint on speech is small, the showing required of the government has generally been held not to be great: "Unless the inhibition ... is significant, government need show no more than a rational justification for its choice." L. TRIE, supra note 21, § 159 (1947) (repealed 1948) , which prohibited any corporation or labor union from making contributions to, or expenditures in connection with, candidates for political office. The government prosecuted the defendant labor union for distributing a publication endorsing a candidate in a congressional election, 335 U.S. at 108, and the union attacked the constitutionality of the statute under the first amendment, id. at 108-09. Justice Rutledge spelled out the government's defense of the statute as follows:
Congress has power to act to preserve the freedom and purity of federal elections under Art. 1, § 4, of the Constitution .... Thus it is claimed the First Amendments guarantees are balanced by this other constitutional provision .... Accordingly, the usual preeminence accorded to the First Amendment liberties disappears, it is said, and the legislative judgment, having rational basis in fact and policy, becomes controlling. Id. at 141 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the result). None of the Justices reached the merits of this argument. A majority of the Court avoided the constitutional issue by construing the statute as not applying to the union's conduct. Id. at 116 (plurality opinion), 129 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Four Justices would have invalidated the statute on grounds of overbreadth, id. at 141-42, 150 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the result), and vagueness, id. at 153 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the result).
The essence of the government's argument was that rationally based congressional actions authorized by the time, place, and manner clause of the Constitution take precedence over first amendment interests. The balancing test offered here differs from this argument in that it contends that the interest in rationality of elections is protected by inherent limitations in the scope of the first amendment itself. laws come into apparent conflict with the first amendment, 0 7 its uniform adoption would incorporate this body of precedent, promoting consistency in application and result. Second, the balancing test would protect society's vital interest in rational electoral outcomes; electoral rationality might alone be a sufficient government interest, in certain situations, to justify restraints on the important interest of freedom of speech. Moreover, the test would allow courts to recognize the realities of irrational voting behavior and to develop first amendment doctrine to deal with the problems posed by electoral irrationality. Finally, the test would be no less protective of freedom of speech than that used by courts in other areas; it would incorporate safeguards from other contexts to allow a gradual and orderly development of first amendment doctrine. 08 
B. Application of the Balancing Test
Had the Buckley Court adopted the balancing approach suggested here, it might have reached a different result on the issue of expenditure limitations. The danger of irrational electoral outcomes caused by allowing unlimited contributions and expenditures is great. 0 9 Congress considered the response of voters to candidate media exposure and deemed the problem serious. 10 The statute was coherent and content-neutral."
The statute attempted to curtail speech which imparted, at least in theory, no useful information. 212 Even if the Court had found FECA too great a restraint on speech after considering these factors, Congress would have been free to document more clearly its concerns or to 2*7 E.g., campaign disclosure and false campaign information cases. See supra text accompanying notes 93-108. " The factors listed supra at text accompanying notes 201-05 were developed by the Court to provide a high degree of protection for speech in situations where the government seeks to abridge speech to serve some other governmental interest. For example, the doctrine of overbreadth requires legislatures to regulate speech with precision so that in restricting speech unprotected by the first amendment the state will not inadvertently punish protected speech as well. Thus, the Court has said, "[A] statute must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected expression." Gooding v. ("NCPAC") , 21 5 a case currently pending before the Supreme Court, involves many of the same issues raised in Buckley, and offers the Court an ideal opportunity to adopt and apply the proposed balancing test. NCPAC concerns the constitutionality of 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f), a section of the Revenue Act of 1971214 that provides in part for the establishment of a fund for public financing of presidential elections. Section 9012(f) calls for criminal sanctions to be invoked against unauthorized political committees 215 that spend over $1000 to further the election of presidential candidates who have chosen to accept public funds for their election campaigns.21 This provision thus parallels the limit on independent expenditures created by FECA and struck down in Buckley, section 9012(f) applying where presidential candidates elect public funding. 21 8 In NCPAC, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that section 9012(f) was unconstitutional under Buckley. 19 The court focused only on the question of whether independent expenditures by unauthorized political committees could corrupt or appear to corrupt elected officials 22 [I]t shall be unlawful for any political committee which is not an authorized committee with respect to the eligible candidates of a political party for President and Vice President in a presidential election knowingly and willfully to incur expenditures to further the election of such candidates. . . in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000. could justify the abridgement of protected speech involved. 21 The court found that the limited possibility of corruption under the circumstances did not justify the broad scope of section 9012(f), which it therefore found unconstitutional. 2 ' In order for the Supreme Court to apply the balancing test suggested here, it would have to look beyond the anti-corruption purposes of section 9012(f) 22 3 and consider the extent to which the statute fosters rational election outcomes. First, the Court should look to congressional intent. Congress was concerned with the rationality of electoral outcomes when it considered the issue of public financing of elections. In the session of Congress prior to the one in which section 9012(f) was enacted, a public election financing bill24 was introduced to prevent money from becoming so influential in political campaigns as to distort the expression of the electoral will.
2 25 In the ninety-second Congress, election law reform $21 Id. at 818. 21 Id. at 837-39. 213 The statement in NCPAC that "the prevention of corruption and its appearance provide the only legitimate basis for regulating speech resulting from campaign finance," id. [A]n election ought to be a time of serious discussion, a time when ideas are brought forth and debated-not for the sound they make but for their meaning, not for their marketability but their merit, not for their packaging but their content. Because the most vital single action of a self-governing society is the election of public officials.
Unless the will of the people can be determined and maintained in elections there can be no government of, by, and for the people. Unless the elective process is surrounded by effective safeguards, there can be no real assurance that the will of the electorate will emerge.
[W]e have a long way to go yet to make our voting system as free and unhampered and as equitable as all of us would wish it to be and to free it from the undue influence of money which is now throttling it ....
The cost of campaigns has mushroomed, the practices of vested interests have become a threat to popular government, the influence of TV and other expanding communications media-and the advertising industry-has skyrocketed and there is now widespread and justifiable public concern over the threat to popular government arising from the improper influence of money in elections ....
The concentration of dollars poured out at election times serves to thwart the will of the American people both directly and subtly. Not many people would sell their was divided between FECA and the bill containing provisions regarding public financing of presidential elections. 22 The two bills were meant to complement each other 227 in an overall scheme to assure that "the merit of the candidate and not the amount of his resources will be the sole criteria [sic] of his fitness for public office." 228 Public financing of campaigns was designed to promote electoral rationality by assuring that each major-party candidate 229 spent the same amount of money in the general election campaign. 2 0 Each candidate would have enough money to reach voters with his message, 28 1 but no candidate would have the ability vastly to outspend his opponent. 23 2 This scheme necessitated limiting the amount of money a candidate could receive from sources other than the public financing fund 2 8 to prevent public funding from down the section after a thoughtful balancing would be far preferable from the standpoint of electoral rationality than a flat constitutional prohibition of limits on independent expenditures.
CONCLUSION
If the purposes for which the United States government was formed 23 8 are to be realized through a democratic system of selfrule, it is essential that elections reflect, as nearly as possible, the rational choices of the people. While freedom of speech is surely a most important constitutionally guaranteed right, to place freedom of speech above the rationality of government itself is to ignore the fact that only through intelligent self-government are any freedoms, including freedom of speech, secured. 9 In today's mediaoriented society, decisions such as Buckley v. Valeo that prohibit limits on runaway campaign expenditures open the door to individuals with the resources to acquire or maintain power by manipulating voters. 4 0
The Supreme Court should reevaluate its interpretation of the first amendment in the election law area in order to allow the federal and state governments to confront the reality of irrational voting. The Court should recognize in its constitutional jurisprudence the need for a balance between freedom of speech and the pursuit of rational electoral outcomes. With such a recognition there would be no absolute bar to legislation designed to protect citizens from distortions of the democratic process worked by individuals with the desire and money to gain office through deception and exploitation of the electorate. 240 "Let a prince, then, conquer and maintain the state; his methods will always be judged honorable and they will be praised by all; because the ordinary people are always taken by the appearance and the outcome of a thing; and in the world there is nothing but ordinary people." N. MACHAVFLLi, THE PRINCE 149 (1964) (1st ed. n.p. 1532).
